Learning in a changing and uncertain environment is a difficult problem. A popular solution is to predict future observations and then use surprising outcomes to update those predictions. However, humans also have a sense of confidence that characterizes the precision of their predictions.
Introduction
Popular learning algorithms like predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Shipp et al., 2013; Aitchison and Lengyel, 2017; Spratling, 2017) and the delta rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1998 ) posit that expectations (or equivalently here, predictions) play a key role in learning from a sequence of observations. Those algorithms, in their simplest form, consist in updating the quantity that is learned in proportion to the prediction error, which is the difference between the prediction and the actual observation. This solution is simple and yet efficient even in changing and uncertain environments (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Yu and Cohen, 2008; Heilbron and Meyniel, 2019) . Other, more sophisticated algorithms exist (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2013; Mathys et al., 2014; Ritz et al., 2018; Moens and Zénon, 2019) , they may formalize the discrepancy between predictions and observations differently (prediction error, improbability, surprise) but they all have in common that this discrepancy is the driving force of learning.
Recently, another aspect of human learning has been put forward: learning is accompanied by a sense of confidence about predictions. Interestingly, this sense of confidence follows, at least in part, the optimal principles of probabilistic inference; in that sense, it is rational (Nassar et al., 2010; Meyniel et al., 2015a; Boldt et al., 2019) . Here, we embrace the proposal that this sense of confidence in a learning context indeed plays a functional role in learning (Nassar et al., 2010; Iglesias et al., 2013; Meyniel et al., 2015b; Meyniel and Dehaene, 2017) , as prescribed by the optimal rules of probabilistic inference. Bayesian models, which obey those rules, show this property. In such models, the update is not only guided by discrepant observations, it is also regulated by confidence about predictions: for a given discrepancy, the update is smaller when the confidence associated with the prediction was larger. This confidence-weighting principle is not specific to learning, it is generally applicable whenever several sources of information must be combined (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ma et al., 2006; Bang et al., 2014 Bang et al., , 2017 Meyniel et al., 2015b; Rohe et al., 2019) . In a learning context, confidence should set the balance between predictions and new data.
The notion of confidence-weighting is related to others, like selective attention (Dayan et al., predictions and observations with the information-theoretic measure of surprise (Shannon, 1948; Strange et al., 2005; O'Reilly et al., 2013) , and the notion of confidence about a prediction, as the precision of the posterior predictive distribution (Summerfield et al., 2011; Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015a; Boldt et al., 2019) .
Previous studies reported conflicting results about the existence of a confidence-weighting mechanism in the brain (Jepma et al., 2016; Meyniel and Dehaene, 2017; Nassar et al., 2019) . Here, we used a probability learning task previously developed, in which the participants' reports of probability estimates and the associated confidence levels are compatible with optimal Bayesian inference. Our goal is two-fold. Numerous studies reported the existence of surprise signals in the brain, i.e. neural responses that are more vigorous for unexpected stimuli (Hillyard et al., 1971; Squires et al., 1976; Nassar et al., 2012; Wacongne et al., 2012; Kolossa et al., 2013; O'Reilly et al., 2013; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014; Garrido et al., 2016; Heilbron and Chait, 2018; Maheu et al., 2019) . We will test whether surprise responses show an additional effect of confidence as prescribed by the confidence-weighting principle, making them suitable for close-to-optimal updates. Second, previous studies suggested that evoked responses are gated by the state of brain networks, which is characterized by specific synchronization of oscillatory activity (Hipp et al., 2011; Siegel et al., 2012; Baumgarten et al., 2016; Hahn et al., 2019; Iemi et al., 2019) and controlled by neuromodulators (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Reimer et al., 2014; Safaai et al., estimate, at any given trial, the transition probabilities currently generating the tones, given previous observations and knowledge of the actual task structure. This inference returns full posterior distributions for the transition probabilities p(A|A) and p(B|B), see Fig 1C. Subjects, as the Bayes-optimal model, were fully informed about the task structure; the only difference is that they were not given the numeric value of the frequency of change points, but the qualitative indication that they are rare. We probed their inference occasionally by asking them to report the probability of the next tone (question #1), and then their confidence about this estimate (question #2). In the Bayes-optimal model, the answer to question #1 corresponds to the mean of the posterior distribution of the relevant transition probability (the one that corresponds to the tone presented on the previous trial), and we formalized the answer to question #2 (confidence) as the log-precision of this distribution (see Methods) because when precision is high, the posterior evidence is highly concentrated around the mean, which gives credence to this value (Fig 1C) .
Subjects' probability estimates were highly correlated with the Bayes-optimal solution (Fig 1D) :
Pearson ρ=0.62 ± 0.04 sem, t 23 =16.75, p=2.2 10 -14 . The same was true for confidence report, although to a lesser extend (Fig 1E) : ρ=0.23 ± 0.04 s.e.m., t 23 =6.19, p=2.6 10 -6 . In this study, it is import to distinguish prediction from confidence, since we test their different roles in the learning process. We thus tested that subjective confidence is not reducible to the prediction itself or related quantities. We estimated a multiple regression model of subjective confidence, using as predictors:
the Bayes-optimal prediction about the next tone, the corresponding predictability (formally, the expected surprise or equivalently, the entropy of prediction), the surprise from the previous trial, and the prediction error on the previous trial, as well as the subject's prediction about the next tone and the corresponding predictability (we cannot include subjective surprise and prediction error from the previous trial since we do not know them due to the occasional nature of the questions).
An effect of some of those factors on confidence exists in the normative model itself (Meyniel et al., 2015a) and was significant in subjects (effect of Bayes-optimal previous surprise: p=0.031; entropy of subject's prediction: p=3.1 10 -8 ), but importantly, the residuals of the multiple regression remain correlated with Bayes-optimal confidence (β=0.039 ± 0.011, t 23 =3.5, p=1.9 10 -3 ,) indicating that subjective confidence cannot be reduced entirely to those factors.
Below, we leverage several features of this task. First, the Bayes-optimal model provides an account of the subjects' probability estimates and confidence on the question trials, which licenses the use of this model to study the brain mechanisms of inference during the no question trials. The no question trials are advantageously numerous and unperturbed by motor artifacts or other processes related to answering questions. Second, the use of change points induce trial-to-trial variations in confidence, which facilitates the exploration of the neural correlates of confidence. The use of transition probabilities further increases those variations by de-correlating confidence from one trial to the next (see Fig S1 for an example).
Evidence for a confidence-weighting of surprise in evoked responses
Many brain responses evoked by stimuli are known to be modulated by surprise: they are more vigorous for unexpected stimuli. Here, we tested whether we could identify such surprise responses and whether they would show additional effects of confidence following the confidence-weighting principle, i.e. dampened responses for higher confidence. To this end, we estimated a multiple regression model, systematically and independently for all sensors and peri-stimulus times, from -0.1 to 0.8 s. Note that the inter-stimulus interval is 1.4 s, such that this time window only contains the current stimulus. We included three factors: the stimulus identity (coded as a binary variable), the Bayes-optimal surprise to the current stimulus and the Bayes-optimal confidence about the prediction of the current stimulus identity. This analysis yielded significant results for the three factors (cluster-forming p<0.001, cluster-level p<0.05, two-tailed, n=1,000).
We also performed a more conservative analysis, yielding very similar results. Confidence being correlated with predictability in the Bayes-optimal model (ρ=-0.37 ± 0.023 s.e.m., t 23 =-16.3, p=4.2 10 -14 ), the effect of confidence we found could be due to correlation with the prediction itself. We estimated another regression model, replacing the Bayes-optimal confidence with the residual confidence, after linearly regressing out effects of prediction and predictability (see Methods). Fig   2A shows the result of this analysis and various significant effects (cluster-forming p<0.001, cluster-level p<0.05, two-tailed, n=1,000): the stimulus identity (105-160 ms) co-occuring with a first surprise response (80-155 ms) followed by a second one (160-290 ms) and a late, prolonged one (360-715 ms). Importantly, an effect of confidence (155-230 ms) overlapped in space and time with the effect of surprise. The time-course activity in the confidence cluster (Fig 2B) shows that the response around 200 ms, characterized by an inward field (negative sign), is more vigorous for unexpected stimuli, and dampened for higher confidence, akin to the confidence-weighted surprise signal predicted by Bayesian learning. Source reconstruction within 155-230 ms (Fig 2C) revealed that the negative effect of confidence and the positive effect of surprise on brain activity overlapped notably in the right inferior frontal sulcus and intermediate precentral sulcus, rather than in the primary auditory cortices.
We further tested the robustness of the confidence effect found within 155-230 ms in the significant sensors shown in Fig 2B. First, the regression model did not include an interaction between surprise and confidence, because their effects on model update is theoretically mostly additive (keep in mind that those quantities are on a log-scale). Their interaction, when included in the previous linear regression model, was not significant (t 23 =0.29, p=0.77) and left the results unchanged. Second, the temporal profiles of Bayes-optimal confidence share commonalities across subjects, for instance, it is low at the beginning of a session, and then waxes and wanes multiple times (see Fig S1) . One concern is that those temporal characteristics may drive, for spurious reasons, the correlation between confidence and the MEG signal. To rule out this possibility, we shuffled the time-courses of (residual Bayes-optimal) confidence with respect to MEG data across subjects to estimate a null distribution for the correlation between confidence and MEG signal, and a Z-statistics. This approach controls for the temporal characteristics of Bayes-optimal confidence observed across all sequences presented to subjects, it is thus very conservative; yet the correlation between confidence and MEG signal remained significant (z=0.95 ± 0.19 s.e.m., t 23 =4.92, p=5.7 10 -5 ).
Modulation of brain states by confidence: spectral components
Next, we examined whether Bayes-optimal confidence would correlate with spectral components of the MEG signal, since power in low frequencies (<40 Hz) typically characterizes the state of large networks, which would then respond differently to incoming stimuli, thereby implementing a confidence-weighting mechanism for surprise (see Discussion). The signal was decomposed across peri-stimulus times and frequencies (6 -40 Hz) and analyzed from -0.5 to 0.9 s. We used the same regression model as used for evoked response, with stimulus identity, Bayes-optimal surprise and residual Bayes-optimal confidence. We found significant effects (cluster-forming p<0.001 and cluster-level p<0.01 two-tailed, corrected for multiple comparisons, n=2,000) of surprise and confidence which were all positive: the higher the confidence (or surprise), the higher the power.
The surprise effect, given its topography, timing and low frequency simply reflected the evoked responses identified in Fig 1A. In contrast, the confidence effect was much more extended in terms of time, frequency and sensor. For simplicity, we grouped significant clusters in pre and poststimulus clusters, and further sub-divided the latter in alpha and beta range, with respect to 12 Hz (Fig 2A) . Note that the confidence effect was present even before the stimulus, see for illustration the time courses ( Fig 2B) and topography (Fig 2C) of the confidence effect in the 15-25 Hz band.
We further tested the robustness of those confidence effects in those three clusters. All clusters passed the tests, but showed that the effect was most robust in the post-stimulus, beta-band cluster; therefore, from now on we focus on this one (unless otherwise specified). First, we controlled that 7/36 152 153 154 155 156 the correlation we found was not driven by the general temporal profile of Bayes-optimal confidence in the course of experimental sessions, using the same permutation procedure as described for the evoked responses. The effect remained significant (z=1.16 ± 0.16 s.e.m., t 23 =7.35, p=1.8 10 -7 ). We also tested whether the effect survived the inclusion of confidence from the previous trial in the regression model, which was true: β=2.5 10 -26 ± 4.3 10 -27 s.e.m., t 23 =5.93, p=4.8 10 -6 ; this test is particularly relevant for the pre-stimulus cluster (β=6.8 10 -26 ± 1.8 10 -26 s.e.m., t 23 =3.85, p=8.2 10 -4 ), denoting a preparation of brain networks to the upcoming stimulus based on the confidence hold specifically in the prediction. This effect suggests that power can change from one trial to the next, following changes in confidence. We tested this possibility by considering pairs of consecutive trials, sorting them into low and high confidence (median split) on the current trial and further sorting them into high vs. low confidence (median split) on the next trial. High-to-low and low-to-high transitions in Bayes-optimal confidence indeed corresponded respectively to decreases and increases in power from one trial to the next, see If some spectral properties of neural signals correlate with the (Bayes-optimal) confidence about the prediction even before the presentation of the next stimulus, then they may be predictive of the confidence reported by subjects when the stimulus is actually replaced by a question. We trained a ridge regression model to predict the subject's confidence report based on the pre-stimulus power (average between -500 and 0 s with respect to the omitted stimulus) in frequencies ranging from 6 to 40 Hz, and evaluated its predictive accuracy in a cross-validated manner (see Methods). Out-ofsample predictions indeed co-varied weakly but significantly with subjective confidence (Pearson ρ=0.06 ± 0.02 s.e.m., t 23 =2.43, p=0.023, Fig 3D) . To explore the frequencies contributing to this predictive power, we estimated the ridge regression weights on the full dataset of each subject (see Fig 3F) . Those weights must be interpreted with caution because they depend on the covariance of the data, and may be different across subjects; nevertheless they suggest a positive effect of (low) beta range power (15-20 Hz) similar to the effect of Bayes-optimal confidence during the noquestion trials. However, power in the alpha range (around 10 Hz) was negatively related to subjective confidence, unlike the effect of optimal confidence on power during no-question trials, suggesting the existence of multiple processings behind subjective confidence.
Modulation of brain states by confidence: pupil-linked arousal
The state of brain networks is also modulated by neuromodulation, in particular the arousal state that is reflected in changes in pupil diameter. Subjects were fixating and the task was auditory, without visual stimuli or change in luminance, the pupil diameter therefore reflected here the 8/36 subject's internal state. We distinguished two aspects of the pupil diameter: phasic and tonic levels, which we measured respectively as changes relative to a pre-stimulus baseline (-250 to 0 ms) and absolute changes. The phasic responses showed a transient increase in response to the stimulus ( Fig   4A) ; we used a multiple linear regression for each peri-stimulus time points, including the Bayesoptimal surprise and Bayes-optimal confidence. The phasic levels showed only an effect of Bayesoptimal surprise whereas the tonic levels showed only an effect of Bayes optimal confidence (cluster-forming p<0.05; cluster-level p<0.001, two-tailed, n=10,000). In order to test the robustness of this effects, we repeated the same multiple regression analysis but considering now the residual Bayes-optimal confidence (cluster-level p=0.005, n=10,000) and to control for the temporal profile of Bayes-optimal confidence, we used the same permutation analysis as described above (clusterlevel p=0.03 one-tailed, n=10,000).
Modulation of evoked responses by brain states
The above analyses showed that the confidence about predictions modulates brain states, in In order to test this possibility, we estimated two multiple regression models onto the evoked responses shown in Fig 2B, including the Bayes-optimal surprise, Bayes-optimal (residual) confidence, and the trial-by-trial value of either the post-stimulus beta-band activity (using the cluster shown in Fig 2A) or the tonic pupil size (averaged within -250 to 0 ms relative to stimulus onset). Bins of successive trials were used to achieve more robust results, see Methods. We corrected results for multiple comparisons using a cluster-forming p<0.05 and cluster-level p<0.05, one-tailed, n=10,000 (Fig 5) .
This analysis replicates the result found in Fig 2: an effect of Bayes-optimal surprise around 200 ms (as well as later) together with an opposite effect of Bayes-optimal confidence. More beta-band power being correlated with higher confidence, beta-band power should dampen the surprise response, whose sign was negative (corresponding to an inward field), this negative effect the surprise response, which was negative (inward field), an effect that should result in a negative regression coefficient, which we observed significantly and selectively around 200 ms.
In order to better interpret those effects, it is important to know whether those beta-band oscillations and the tonic pupil size are two sides of the same coin (but note that pupil data is available only in 18/24 subjects, reducing statistical power). If so, one would expect a negative trialto-trial correlation, since those signals co-vary, respectively, positively and negatively with Bayesoptimal confidence. However, this correlation was negligible, if not even slightly positive (Pearson ρ=0.043 ± 0.03 s.e.m., t 17 =1.53, p=0.14). Instead of using separate multiple regression models, one can include those two signals in the same model of the evoked response, along with the Bayesoptimal surprise and confidence. The regression coefficients become difficult to interpret since the predictors (pupil size, beta-band power) share correlation with confidence, which itself correlates with the evoked response. However, we found a significant effect of pupil from 115 to 220 ms (cluster-forming p<0.05 and cluster-level p<0.05, one-tailed, n=10,000).
Discussion (1500)
Subjects estimated the probabilities that characterize a sequence of inputs, and the confidence associated with those estimates, following (to some extent) the principles of Bayesian inference.
Those estimates were accurate despite the presence of volatility. Bayesian inference leverages the confidence-weighting principle to remain accurate in the face of volatility, by dynamically modulating the update prompted by surprising observations. The MEG responses evoked by stimuli showed numerous signatures of surprise (vigorous responses to unexpected stimuli) and for one of them, an additional effect of confidence, conforming to the confidence-weighting principle. Wholebrain beta-band power increased with optimal confidence and predictive of the actual subject's confidence. Lack of confidence increased the tonic pupil size while phasic dilation reflected surprise. Desynchronization of beta-band power and higher tonic pupil size increased the evoked, confidence-weighted surprise response. Overall, the results indicate that changes in brain states indexed by beta-range power and neuromodulation, are related to differential responses to surprising stimuli, providing a mechanism for a dynamic confidence-weighting of learning.
We now discuss those results in the context of previous studies, which requires to delineate precisely what aspects of confidence we investigated here. It is the confidence that accompanies probability estimates on a trial-by-trial basis, thus it is not "global" or related self-confidence (Rouault et al., 2019) . It is also not related to whether the stimulus is perceived clearly or ambiguously, which is important in general for inference (Kepecs et al., 2008; Mathys et al., 2014;  10/36 Meyniel et al., 2015b; Pouget et al., 2016; Bang and Fleming, 2018) but does not play a role here since stimuli were perceived without ambiguity. In addition, most results here are based on Bayesoptimal confidence: the one that the subject should hold. It was indeed correlated with subject's confidence (the confidence actually hold by subjects) and beta-band power (which itself was also predictive of subject's confidence). Yet, Bayes-optimal confidence remains only an imperfect model of subject's confidence and both quantities, although related here, should not be conflated.
The type of confidence studied here (about a learned estimate) is also different from most studies, which focused on confidence about memory (Koriat, 2012; Fleming et al., 2014) and confidence about decisions (Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015b; Pouget et al., 2016) .
Those different types of confidence correspond theoretically to different constructs: confidence about a memory or decisions correspond to the probability of the decision or memory being correct (Pouget et al., 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017) , whereas confidence about a learned estimate (even when this estimate is itself a probability) corresponds to a higher-order quantity: the precision of a posterior distribution (Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015a; Navajas et al., 2017; Boldt et al., 2019) .
Last, previous studies have not always disentangled confidence from related quantities. In many situations, confidence about predictions (i.e. posterior precision) is related to predictability.
Previous studies showed that the precision of predictions modulates reaction times (Vossel et al., 2014) , functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity in fronto-parietal networks (Vossel et al., 2015) , pupil size (Vincent et al., 2019) , but with tasks and analyses that leave unclear whether the effect is genuinely about precision, or also about predictability. A similar and related confound exists between expectation and attention, which are often related in practice but distinct in theory (Summerfield and de Lange, 2014) . Here, we controlled specifically for this correlation by using the residual confidence in our analyses. This is important because many brain signals are associated with predictability (Friedman et al., 2001; Strange et al., 2005; Summerfield and de Lange, 2014; Vossel et al., 2015; Kok et al., 2017; Vincent et al., 2019) .
We now discuss more broadly the putative mechanisms of confidence-weighting in a learning context. Our interpretation is that confidence modulates the state of brain networks, which then process the feedforward input differently, in particular by increasing (low confidence) or decreasing larger difference in response. The neural gain is largely thought to depend on attention, neuromodulation and oscillatory activity in brain networks, three factors that we discuss below.
The role of confidence on update described here is computationally identical to the one ascribed to selective attention: some observations are given more weight than others; this link has been already discussed by others (Dayan et al., 2000) . This is also related to the notion of neural gain which enhances or suppresses the effect of a given stimulus on further, downstream processing (Eldar et al., 2013) . Noradrenaline was proposed as a major modulator of the neural gain (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) . This is particularly interesting since we found modulations of tonic pupil size by confidence. Specifically, we found larger pupil size for lower confidence, which is consistent with previous studies (Colizoli et al., 2018) . Non-luminance based changes in pupil size reflect the arousal state and in particular, noradrenaline release. Correlation between pupil size and firing activity in the locus coeruleus, the main nucleus releasing noradreline in the brain (Salgado et al., 2016) , was found in both rodents (Reimer et al., 2014) and macaque monkeys (Joshi et al., 2016) . In addition, noradrenergic activity, unlike cholinergic activity, correlates with both fast and slow changes in pupil size (Reimer et al., 2016) . The effect of confidence on tonic pupil found here could therefore arise from a change in noradrenergic activity. This noradrenergic activity changes neurons' membrane potential (McGinley et al., 2015) and its slow fluctuations (Reimer et al., 2014) , promoting the selectivity of sensory processing, akin to the neural gain model. Similarly, activation of the locus-coeruleus (and increased pupil size) promotes feature selectivity in the sensory domain (Krishnamurthy et al., 2017; Rodenkirch et al., 2019) . Changes in pupil size are also related to changes in the processing of sensory information and performance during perceptual decision making tasks (de Gee et al., 2014 (de Gee et al., , 2017 , with different effects of phasic and tonic pupil size (van Kempen et al., 2019) as in the present results.
In line with this noradrenergic modulation of neural gain, previous studies showed that larger tonic pupil size renders fMRI responses more extreme, i.e. lower or higher (Eldar et al., 2013) .
Larger pupil size and higher activity of the locus coeruleus are also associated with better memorization (Hoffing and Seitz, 2015; Takeuchi et al., 2016) , and thus a long lasting effect of the current observations. Rodent studies showed that one-shot learning can occur with noradrenergic input to the hippocampus (Wagatsuma et al., 2018) . More generally, a role for noradreline in confidence-weighted learning is consistent with the fact that increased pupil size co-occurs with increased updating (Nassar et al., 2012 ) and reset of current strategies (Devauges and Sara, 1990) , and that more volatile learning contexts are associated with larger pupil size (Pulcu and Browning, showing that manipulation of noradrenergic activity impacts the estimation of confidence in a decision task (Hauser et al., 2017) , learning dynamics when unexpected changes occur (Marshall et al., 2016) and the effect of surprise on update (Jepma et al., 2016 (Jepma et al., , 2018 .
The modulation of responses to new observations (notably surprising ones) by the current state of neural network has also been associated repeatedly to specific rhythms of network activity, which provide signatures of networks' dynamics and computations (Wang, 2010; Siegel et al., 2012) . This state-dependent modulation should aim at prioritizing new evidence when confidence is low, and on the contrary, preserve current estimates from conflicting evidence when confidence is high. Our data indicate that beta (and perhaps alpha) band power could play a key role in such a prioritization. This result is in line with the previous proposal that higher beta-band power preserves the current state of networks, promoting a "status quo" rather than a change (Engel and Fries, 2010) which may also be true for lower (alpha) frequencies (Klimesch et al., 2007) . Beta-band power in particular is associated with feedback signals (Bastos et al., 2015) , stronger attention and top-down control (Buschman and Miller, 2007; Salazar et al., 2012) , and the prioritization of the current brain states over new inputs (Spitzer and Haegens, 2017) . In support to this view, stronger low frequency (<30 Hz) oscillations attenuate early evoked sensory responses (Iemi et al., 2019) , increase the criterion of perceptual detection (resulting in fewer detections) by modulating baseline excitability (Limbach and Corballis, 2016; Benwell et al., 2017; Craddock et al., 2017; Iemi et al., 2017) and degrade performance in perceptual decisions (Haegens et al., 2011) .
It is noticeable that the modulation of evoked surprise responses was confined to early poststimulus latencies (around 200 ms) rather than occurring later, as could be expected for instance from the proposal that later brain waves like the P300 correspond to the updating, which in theory is confidence-weighted, and are enhanced by attention (Donchin, 1981; Friedman et al., 2001; Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007; Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Faugeras et al., 2012; Kolossa et al., 2013 Kolossa et al., , 2015 Strauss et al., 2015) . However, those later brain-waves, in particular the P300, are not systematically a signature of update, for instance in a recent EEG study (Nassar et al., 2019) , the P300 was modulated by surprise, but equally and irrespective of the need to update the current estimate. In line with our results, another EEG study showed that the difference between expected and unexpected sounds (standard and deviant in a oddball task) was larger around 175-200 ms (and after 350 ms) when pupil size was larger (Hong et al., 2014) . In rodents, activation of the locus coeruleus also increased the amplitude of multi-unit activity (in the sensory cortex involved in the task) specifically within 125-200 ms post-stimulus (Safaai et al., 2015) . The mismatch negativity, a surprise response peaking around 170 ms, also seems better explained (in a roving paradigm) by confidence-weighted updates than by change detection, adaptation or simple prediction errors (Lieder et al., 2013) . Those studies are thus consistent with the latency of the confidence-weighted surprise response we found here. Source reconstruction showed that this effect may arise in particular from the inferior frontal sulcus, which is consistent with the location of the confidenceweighted surprise responses detected with fMRI in the same probability learning task as used here (Meyniel and Dehaene, 2017) .
Together, the studies quoted above and our own results support the idea that higher synchronization in alpha/beta band frequencies and lower noradrenergic activity could be mechanisms by which the brain shields current estimates against update prompted by surprising observations, thereby implementing a confidence-weighting mechanism.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-four participants (16 women) aged between 20 and 34 (mean: 25.4, SD: 3.7) were recruited by public advertisement. They gave their written inform consent prior to participating; the study was approved by the Ethics Committee Ile de France VII (CPP 08-021). For one subject, one of the four session was unavailable due to a technical problem.
Task
This task and minor variants have been used previously (Meyniel et al., 2015a; Meyniel and Dehaene, 2017; Heilbron and Meyniel, 2019) . The task was run using Matlab and Psychtoolbox. probabilities), and then the confidence about this prediction (slider whose ends were labeled "not at all" and "fully").
Subjects were thoroughly instructed about this generative process. In order to acquaint subjects with the notion of randomness and transition probabilities, we used a graphical display with animated "wheels of fortune". Each wheel corresponded to a pie chart, whose sections indicated the probability to repeat the same tone, or to change it, and each of the two charts corresponded to tones A or B, thus effectively representing transition probabilities. A ball rolled around the wheel with decaying speeding, ending at a random position (in section "repeat" or "change") that triggered the onset of the corresponding tone. Subjects rolled the ball multiple times to generate short sequences.
In order to explain the notion of change point, we introduced a key which, when pressed, changed the size of sections "repeat" and "change" randomly, in both wheels. Subjects then generated sequences with change points. We then explained to subjects that, during the task, they would only hear the sequences of tones and that they would have to figure out the underlying pie charts (i.e. transition probabilities) and the moment of change points. They performed at least one full session as training.
Bayes-optimal learning model
The Bayes-optimal model used here is described elsewhere (Meyniel et al., 2015a (Meyniel et al., , 2016 Heilbron and Meyniel, 2019) and the corresponding Matlab code is available online: https://github.com/florentmeyniel/MinimalTransitionProbsModel. We used it with the following options: the learned quantities are "transitions", the estimation type is "HMM", the probability grid used for numeric integration has 20*20 values and the prior about transition probabilities is flat.
Below, we summarize the main aspects of this model.
The model uses Bayes rule to infer optimally the posterior distribution of transition probabilities at any given trial, denoted θ t (the bold font indicates it is a pair of transition probabilities) given a set of assumptions M and previous observations y 1:t :
called Markov property: if one knows θ at time t, then the next observation y t+1 is generated with θ t+1 = θ t if no change occurred and with another value drawn from the prior distribution otherwise.
Therefore, if one knows θ t , previous observations are not needed to estimate θ t+1 . The generative process can thus be cast as a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which enables to iterate the computation of the joint distribution of θ and observations, starting from the prior, and updating this distribution by moving forward in the sequence of observations:
We computed this integral numerically by discretization on a grid. We obtained the posterior probability by normalizing this joint distribution.
Formalization of prediction, surprise and confidence
The prediction, i.e. the probability of the next stimulus (question #1 asked to subjects) was computed from the posterior using Bayes rule. It is the mean of the posterior distribution of the relevant transition probability (the one that corresponds to the tone presented on the previous trial), which we note θ rel .
The surprise corresponding to the actual new observation was defined, following (Shannon, 1948) , in bits, as the negative logarithm (to base 2) of the observation likelihood:
surprise=−log 2 ( p( y t +1 |y 1 :t )) (Eq 4)
The confidence about the probability estimate (question #2) was computed as the log-precision of the posterior distribution of the relevant transition probability (Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015a Meyniel et al., , 2015b Navajas et al., 2017; Boldt et al., 2019) :
the scalp, and we measured head position within the MEG system at the beginning of each session with four head position indicator coils placed on the subject's head. Electro-oculograms, electrocardiogram and pupilometry were recorded simultaneously with MEG.
Raw MEG signals were first pre-processed with the constructor software MaxFilter, in order to correct for between-session head movement (recordings realigned on the first session), removing nearby magnetic interference and correcting for noisy sensors by means of Source Space Separation (Taulu and Simola, 2006) .
The data was further pre-processed with FieldTrip (Oostenveld et al., 2011) . The signal was epoched from -1.4 s to 1.4 s relative to stimulus onsets, and -1.2 s to 0.5 s relative to question onsets. Epochs were visually inspected to reject those with abrupt jumps, spikes or muscular artifacts, and line filtered (50, 100, 150 Hz). Epochs were then decomposed with ICA; components were visually inspected and those resembling artifacts corresponding to eye blinks and heart beats were removed. Outlier epochs were rejected based on the signal variance and kurtosis. The mean number of trials finally included were 1335.8 ± 127 SD for stimuli and 90.2 ± 7.9 SD for questions.
In order to analyze evoked responses, the signals were low-passed filtered (30 Hz) and downsampled to 200 Hz. In order to analyze the spectral components, the signals was decomposed into peri-stimulus times (every 50 ms) and frequencies (every frequency between 7 and 40 Hz) with
Morlet wavelets (using a f/σ f ratio of 7, where f is the frequency and σ f is the spectral standard deviation of the wavelet).
No baseline correction was applied since trials are not independent from one another in our transition probability task.
Source reconstruction
We acquired anatomical T1-weighted magnetic resonance images (3T Prisma Siemens scanner)
for 18 of our 24 subjects with 1 mm resolution. This anatomical image was segmented to extract the cortical surface and head shape with FreeSurfer Fischl et al., 1999) and
segmented tissues were imported into BrainStorm (Tadel et al., 2011) to perform source reconstruction. For subjects without a personalized anatomical image, we used BrainStorm's default template (ICBM152). MEG and MRI data were co-registered using the digitized anatomical markers. All cortical meshes comprised ~15 000 vertices.
We estimated at the subject-level the sources corresponding to the signal averaged within 155-230 ms (relative to stimulus onset) and across trials with high and low Bayes-optimal surprise, and high and low Bayes-optimal confidence (using median split for both). We estimated the noise covariance matrix from the signal within -0.3 to -0.1 s relative to stimulus onset, concatenated across trials. We used a normalized minimum norm estimate of the current density map, with a loose orientation constraint orthogonal to the cortical sheet (parameter 0.2), corresponding to the option dSPM in BrainStorm. The subject-level differences of current's norm (high vs. low surprise, high vs. low confidence) where spatially normalized to the FSAverage atlas and analyzed statistically with a t-test at the group level. For display, the t-map was projected onto a high resolution mesh (~300,000 vertices).
Pupil size recording and pre-processing
Eye gaze and pupil size were monitored using EyeLink 1000. Due to technical errors in saving files, the data is available only for 18 of the 24 subjects. Blinks were delineated (adding a margin of 50 ms before and after) and the data within them linearly interpolated; the signal was then low-pass filtered (5 Hz) and epoched within -0.5 to 1.5 s relative to the stimulus onset. Epochs whose total blink duration exceeded 20 % were excluded. Finally, the data was z-scored per subject.
Regression models
All multiple regression models included a constant and z-scored predictors. The significance of regression coefficients were assessed with group-level t-tests.
We often used the "residual" Bayes-optimal confidence as a predictor, which was computed by linearly regressing out the effect of prediction and predictability. More precisely, we estimated a multiple linear regression of the Bayes-optimal confidence, using as predictors the prediction itself (i.e. the Bayes-optimal estimate of the transition probability of the next stimulus, p(A)), its square and logarithm, log(p(A)) and log(p(B)). The residual Bayes-optimal confidence was defined as the residuals of this multiple regression.
The multiple regression of the evoked response shown in Fig 5 involved the post-stimulus betaband power, testing for a relation between the evoked response and power on the same trial. Note that the sensors and timing largely overlap; a spurious correlation is thus expected due to signal expression: when recorded MEG signals from this region are stronger or less noisy (e.g. due to artifacts, sensor noise or reduced brain-sensor distance related to breathing and motion) both the measured power and evoked response should be stronger. Luckily, our prediction is that when power is stronger, the evoked response should be weaker, due to the confidence-weighting mechanism, resulting in a sign opposite to the spurious (artifactual) correlation. We predicted that if the spurious correlation is driven by fast trial-to-trial variations in signal expression (compatible e.g.
with breathing), averaging successive trials into bins would disrupt it. In contrast, the expected (non spurious) correlation between power and evoked response being driven by slower trial-to-trials changes in confidence and power, it should be more robust to this binning procedure; in practice the correlation between pairs of adjacent trials was 0.61 (±0.001 s.e.m., t 23 =65.8, p=1.0 10 -27 ) for confidence, and 0.15 (±0.022 s.e.m., t 23 =6.85, p=5.5 10 -7 ) for power (to be more conservative, we removed linearly the effect of Bayes-optimal confidence before computing this correlation). The effect of power onto the evoked response indeed greatly increased when using non-overlapping bins of 10 consecutive trials, specifically at the moment when such a correlation is expected (around 200 ms), see Fig S3A. This result holds for different bin sizes (Fig S3B) . We reproduced qualitatively this effect with simulations (Fig S3C) under the following assumptions: 1) beta-band power linearly reflects Bayes-optimal confidence and has auto-correlated noise from trial-to-trial, 2) the evoked response linearly reflects surprise, beta-band power (negatively) and has non-correlated noise, 3) both signals are corrupted at the measurement level by the same non-correlated noise.
Correction for multiple comparisons
For signals with two or more dimensions (times and sensors; times, sensors and frequencies), correction for multiple comparisons was computed with FieldTrip, following permutations and cluster-based statistics (sum of t-values in the cluster) effectively controlling the family-wise error rate (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007) . Sensors located less than 4 cm apart were considered as neighbors. For signals with one dimension (time), we used a custom code implementing the same cluster-based, permutation test. In the text, we systematically report the cluster-forming threshold as p-value, the cluster-level p-value and number of permutations used for the test (n).
Cross-validated predictive accuracy
In order to estimate whether the subject's confidence could be predicted from the pre-stimulus power across different frequencies, we used a cross-validated ridge regression. The power was averaged within -0.5 to 0 s relative to the stimulus onset and z-scored across questions. We used a ridge penalty of 0.01, but the results are quite robust to the choice of this parameter. We adopted a cross-validation approach: the data were split into 20 distinct sub-sets of inter-leaved trials and at each iteration, the ridge regression was estimated on all sub-sets but one, and its parameter estimates were used to predict subjective confidence on the left-out sub-set. We assessed the accuracy of this prediction as the Pearson correlation between predicted and actual confidence at the subject's level. confidence on the current trial, and further sorted into high and low residual Bayes-optimal confidence on the next trial, therefore forming pairs that kept similar levels (dashed line) or changed drastically (plain line). The (z-scored) power in the post-stimulus beta-band cluster ( Fig 3A) showed fast, trial-to-trial changes that parallel the residual Bayes-optimal confidence (*: p<0.005, paired t-test). (B) The correlation between post-stimulus beta-band power and (residual) Bayesoptimal confidence was not driven by specific values but indeed correspond to parametric changes. 
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